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Abstract: Tariffs or price control has been a controversial subject in recent 
years. The debate between legal experts and economists is still a hot topic in any 
discussion. Tariff control regulated in the work creation omnibus law seems to 
be a topic that must be discussed again regarding this regulation's urgency. Are 
specific prices so impressive that the government can intervene in regulating 
them? This article examines the urgency of rules regarding price controls to 
create a healthy competitive environment. After conducting a critical literature 
review, it was analyzed with critical analysis and looking at the objective of 
competition law was to maximize welfare by protecting competition. The results 
in this article indicated that the government could only intervene in regulating 
price-fixing only if companies' pricing could harm the country's economy and 
consumer welfare. The government, therefore, had an interest in regulating the 
price ceiling. Meanwhile, the price floor, which was believed to be pro-consumer 
and could promote consumer welfare had no interest and should not have been 
limited by the government. 
 
Keyword: Price control; Price ceiling; Price floor. 
INTRODUCTION 
On October 5, 2020, the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia (DPR RI) 
approved the Work Creation (Cipta Kerja) Omnibus Law Draft. The law, which was then officially 
passed on November 2, 2020, became Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 11 of 2020 on 
Work Creation. The 1187-pages law regulating the Job Creation Law consists of 15 chapters and 
186 articles. It started its controversy in the community before it was passed due to illegal flaws 
until the ratification. Besides, this law is also considered to be endangering the workers' welfare 
and society in general. Therefore, employment regulations have become a hot issue in this law, 
leading to rejection from various social elements. 
However, speaking of welfare, regulations related to business competition that regulate 
price control should be a serious concern. In the applicable Work Creation Law, price control is 
regulated in Article 71, which regulates amendments to Law Number 36 of 1999 concerning 
Telecommunications wherein the amendment to Article 28 of the Telecommunications Law 
states that the Central Government can set a price ceiling and base price regarding public 
interests and fair business competition.  
Previously, the state (through its ministry) also intervened in prices and tariffs in several 
service sectors, such as price control in the Regulation of the Minister of Transportation of the 
Republic of Indonesia Number PM 36 of 2016 on Basic Tariffs, Upper Limits, and Lower limits 
Tariffs for Intercity, Inter-Province, Economy Class Passenger Transportation on the Road by 
Public Bus Car. This regulation then became the spotlight and criticism of the Indonesian 
Competition Commission (KPPU), especially regarding the lower limit tariff's determination. In 
Should the State Control Tariffs? 
Vol 8, No 1 (2021): Page no: 22-36 
 
Zaid1, Farouk Aisha Dawaki2, Sabit Kazeem Ololade3| 23 
 
KPPU views, the lower limit tariff will impact inefficiency in the transportation service industry, 
which will result in high tariffs for consumers (Issetiabudi, 2017). 
In 2019, the government issued two ministerial regulations regarding price control in the 
online ride-sharing and airfare sectors. In the online motorcycle taxi service sector, the Ministry 
of Transportation released Ministerial Decree Number KP 348 of 2019 on Guidelines for 
Calculating Service Cost for Using Motorcycles Used for Public Interests Conducted By An 
Applications. This regulation then becomes the attention of KPPU that the Ministry of 
Transportation should pay attention to the protection of the driver-partners, which is more 
important than controlling prices (lower limits) which tend not to pro-consumers (Maulandy, 
2019). 
In the airfare sector, the Minister of Transportation, through the Minister of 
Transportation Regulation Number 20 of 2019, which regulates the Procedure and Formulation 
for the Calculation of Airfare Ceilings for Passengers of Economy Class Services for Domestic 
Commercial Airlines Transport, replaces the previous stipulation of the Minister of 
Transportation Regulation Number 14 of 2016 on Regulation of Minister of Transportation 
Number 14 of 2016 on the Formulation Mechanism for Calculating and Determining the Price 
Floor and Airfare Ceilings for Passengers of Economy Class Services for Domestic Scheduled 
Commercial Air Transportation. Regulations regarding the prices and tariffs are then regulated in 
the Decree of the Minister of Transportation Number 72 of 2019 on Airfare Ceilings for 
Passengers of Economy Class Services for Domestic Commercial Airlines. 
Concerning the regulation, KPPU once again criticized and advised the Ministry of 
Transportation to reconsider the enactment of the price floor policy for airplane tickets that ICC 
assessed as potentially violating Law Number 5 of 1999 on Prohibition Monopolistic Practices 
and Unfair Competition (Kppu.go.id). The criticism was also raised by the National Consumer 
Protection Agency (BPKN), considering that the airline's floor and ceiling price fare policies were 
not following the rules in Law Number 8 of 1999 on Consumer Protection (Anggit, 2019). 
 
Table.1 Price Control Policies in Various Sectors in Indonesian Laws and Regulations 
Sectors of Industry Laws and Regulations 
Public Transportation Regulation of the Minister of Transportation Number PM 36 of 2016 on Basic 
Tariffs, Upper Limits, and Lower limits Tariffs for Intercity, Inter-Province, 
Economy Class Passenger Transportation on the Road by Public Bus Car 
Online Ride-Sharing Decree of the Minister of  Transportation Number KP 348 of 2019 on 
Guidelines for Calculating Service Cost for Using Motorcycles Used for Public 
Interests Conducted By An Applications 
Airfare Regulation of the Minister of Transportation Number 20 of 2019, regulating 
the Procedure and Formulation for the Calculation of Airfare Ceilings for 
Passengers of Economy Class Services for Domestic Commercial Airlines 
Transport replacing the previous stipulation of the Minister of Transportation 
Regulation Number 14 of 2016 on the Formulation Mechanism for Calculating 
and Determining the Price Floor and Airfare Ceilings for Passengers of 
Economy Class Services for Domestic Scheduled Commercial Air 
Transportation 
Decree of the Minister of Transportation Number 72 of 2019 on Airfare 
Ceilings for Passengers of Economy Class Services for Domestic Commercial 
Airlines 
Telecommunication Law Number 11 of 2020 on Work Creation 
 
Based on Table.1 all the criticisms raised against these rules are attributed to consumers 
because every activity (such as business, trade, etc.) that interacts with consumers must 
prioritize consumers' interests. Hence, every rule (in this case, price control) is related to 
consumer protection (Mehta, 2018). On the other hand, price control has been debated by 
several parties and has been controversial for a long time because it indicated the government's 
efforts to intervene, regulate and control the price. It has also long been a standard topic for the 
economist. Hence, since Adam Smith's era, one question is, "Are specific prices so special that 
government controlling them is justified?" 
In this study, the authors will analyze the policies or rules related to the Indonesian 
government's price control through several laws and regulations. The authors will analyze each 
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dimension of price control related to welfare through an economic approach: the antimonopoly 
law's goal. This search will provide insights on more effective regulation (especially in pricing 
policies) to the country's ideal. 
 
RESEARCH METHOD 
This study used a critical literature review method. A critical literature review is an 
objective, thorough summary of evaluation and synthesis of information and critical analysis of 
available relevant literature on the topic being discussed (Nuruddeen, 2015). This type of review 
often requires more creative data sets, as the aim is usually to cover all published articles on the 
topic and combine perspectives and insights from different fields of research traditions (Snyder, 
2019). 
This study's data were taken from primary data sources such as laws and regulations and 
secondary data from books, journals, and articles. The data were then collected by collecting 
literature reviews and then analyzed using a critical analysis of the literature to identify 
strengths and weaknesses and deficiencies or contradictions between literature sources 
(Torraco, 2016). 
 
RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
The Advantages and Disadvantages of Price Control 
The main issue in pricing activity is when the government intervenes by setting and 
controlling prices and creating its limitations. At first, the basic idea of price controls is that if 
specific free movements (unregulated) of prices result in dire consequences, or if it makes some 
essential national goals challenging to be achieved, it is legal to keep an eye on these prices and 
ultimately to make the situation better (Laguerodie & Vergara, 2008). However, as time goes by, 
the price control regulation has been controversial and created pros and cons in many 
arguments and discussions due to the positive (advantages) and negative (disadvantages) 
impacts of the regulation (Vernon et al., 2006). 
Microeconomically, pricing control enables business actors or manufacturers to confirm 
underlying production costs (Myers & Harvey, 2001). Price control also has the advantage that it 
goes beyond that. According to Article 71 Law Number 11 of 2020 on Work Creation which 
regulates amendments to Law Number 36 of 1999 concerning Telecommunications wherein the 
amendment to Article 28 of the Telecommunications Law states that price control is made in 
protecting the interests of the community and creating fair business competition. Some scholars 
also noted the advantages of price control where price control is needed to maintain and ensure 
that prices in the market remain within reasonable limits (Normal) (Reveley, 2012). Even in 
some cases and reasons, price control aims to create public order and prevent public unrest by 
controlling essential commodities' prices (Corradi, 2018). 
Experts reveal many distortion effects (Deo et al., 2020). Thus, most economists' 
instinctive reaction to price control is harmful and will result in nothing but shortages and 
misallocation of resources and trigger black markets and high transaction costs (Ghosh & 
Whalley, 2004) and illegal economic practice (Coyne & Coyne, 2015). 
Over the past twenty years, many countries have tried to implement it. Instead of expecting 
to control the price level, it does not have an adequate effect, either on microeconomics or 
macroeconomics (Kenyon, 2013). Some believe that price controls damage the market by 
preventing an increase in the supply of products from meeting demand. This rule would only 
lead to significant welfare losses, lower product quality, reduced investment, and higher prices in 
the long run (Coyne & Coyne, 2015). Some others think that price control is a rule established by 
the government that will only suspend individual rights (both business actors and consumers), 
impose a fair legal system, and impose arbitrary bureaucratic control over people's lives (Carr, 
1976). It is also a form of legislative action that disrupts private contracts in the market, causing 
changes in the quality of goods being transacted or eliminates the existing transaction. It makes 
trading stop and causes the market to be clean (Cheung, 1974). 
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Table.2 Overall Advantages and Disadvantages of Price Control 
Price Control 
 Sources Affected Parties 
Overall 
Advantages 
Protecting the interests of the 
community 
Law Number 11 of 2020 
on Work Creation 
Consumers or 
Community 
Creating fair business competition Law Number 11 of 2020 
on Work Creation 
Business Actors 
Maintaining and ensuring that 
prices in the market remain 
within reasonable limits (Normal) 
(Reveley, 2012) Consumer and 
Business Actors 
Preventing public unrest  (Corradi, 2018) State 
Enabling business actors or 
manufacturers to confirm the 
coverage of underlying production 
costs 




Triggering black markets and high 
transaction costs 
(Ghosh & Whalley, 2004) State and 
Consumers 
Triggering illegal economic 
practice 
(Coyne & Coyne, 2015) State 
losing welfare, lowering product 
quality, creating higher prices 
(Coyne & Coyne,2015) and 
(Cheung, 1974) 
Consumers 
suspending individual rights (Carr, 1976) Business actors 
and Consumers 
Imposing arbitrary bureaucratic 
control over people's lives 
(Carr,1976) Business actors 
and Consumers 
Disrupting private contracts in the 
market 
(Cheung, 1974) Consumers and 
Business Actors 
Cleaning the Market (Cheung, 1974) Consumers and 
Business Actors 
Distorting markets and 
consequently harming economic 
growth and poverty reduction 
(Cerda et al,2020), 





Based on the Table.2 the price control, which interprets its effects, economic behavior, and 
limits, is still relatively rigid (Cheung, 1974) and has been used in developed countries with 
social intentions. As a result, this policy often distorts markets and negatively impacts economic 
growth and poverty reduction (Cerda et al., 2020; Guenette, 2020; Mehta, 2018). If the state aims 
and expects to create fair competition, improving the competitive environment can be more 
practical than price control. Carefully designed and properly enforced antimonopoly laws that 
involve consumer protection laws are an essential component of an institutional framework that 
supports market mechanisms. A robust legal and regulatory framework that supports 
competitive markets provides a more effective response to many issues than price controls 
(Guenette, 2020). In short, price control should not be used as a rule or regulation to create fair 
competition.  
 
The Urgency of Price Control 
If indeed price control is intended to create a fair business as stipulated in Law No.11 of 
2020, this is a precious objective. Since 'Fair Competition' is not only a legal concept, it is also an 
important ethical concept. This term refers to what companies are legally and ethically required 
to fulfill in their internal and external business relationships. Even so, policymakers should not 
ignore aspects of consumer protection, interests, and welfare. Because in the antimonopoly law, 
consumer protection (Moisejevas & Novosad, 2013) or welfare (Colombo, 2011; Easterbrook, 
1981) is one of the main objectives as stipulated in article 2 of Law number 5 of 1999 on 
Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices and Unfair Business Competition. Modern economic theory 
has also explicitly stated that a policy must promote consumer welfare because efficiency alone is 
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Figure.1 The Form of Price Control 
Source: (Sinha, 2000) 
 
Figure.1 As the price control included price floor and ceiling (Sinha, 2000), the authors 
realize the bad possibilities if the state does not control prices through law. First, setting prices 
too low will only lead to predatory pricing practices and push low-quality products out of the 
market (Bilotkach, 2014; Sinha, 2000). Therefore, rules related to the price floor are necessary. 
Second, the absence of regulations related to price control will result in inflation because the 
market pricing is too high, triggering an increase in inflation. Therefore, a regulation regarding 
the price ceiling is needed to avoid the adverse effects of inflation. 
 
Price Floor 
Floor pricing, as the name implies, is a rule that establishes the minimum price charged by 
the company for the products or services it offers. In general, an efficient base price should be 
set at a level that reflects all the firm's resource costs in producing a product or service 
(Weisman, 2002). Based on the existing literature, it is common to regulate base prices in 
various industries, with the main economic reason for setting the base price is to prevent 
predatory pricing or anti-competitive price pressures (Sinha, 2000; Weisman, 2002). 
Based on Article 20 of Law Number 5 of 1999, "business actors are prohibited from 
supplying goods and or services utilizing selling at a loss or setting meager prices with the 
intention of getting rid of shutting down the business of their competitors in relevant market so 
that it may result in monopolistic practices and or unfair business competition". 
Predatory pricing has become a classic problem in antitrust, competition, as well as 
antimonopoly law enforcement. Like other competition regulation areas, successful 
enforcement requires the right action to identify and prevent anti-competitive behavior without 
hindering good behavior in the process. However, predatory price cuts are tough to distinguish 
from intense competition. Courts that prohibit specific price cuts unreasonably can freeze 
behavior (Scott Hemphill, 2001). For that reason, predatory pricing has been debated by some 
experts and is considered a paradoxical offense. The "predator" was accused of charging too low 
as a good move but overreaching. The law's role is likely to influence the perception of most 
people who consider predation socially dangerous because current artificially low prices 
exclude competitors and allow future high prices (Crane, 2005). 
Predatory pricing occurs when a company sets the price of its products below the market 
price and competitors with which the company sacrifices temporary income in the short term to 
make its competitors out of business or unable to enter (barriers to entry). Once the target has 
been eliminated, the presumed predator then raises its price to a high "supracompetitive" level 
and generates a high profit to "recoup" the previously lost income. By eliminating competitors 
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competition in the long run. Such a reduction in competition would theoretically allow the 
predatory guess not only to recover all lost revenue but also make higher-than-possible profits 
before the competition was reduced (Funk & Jaag, 2018; Sheffet, 1994).  
Based on the explanation, the predatory pricing strategy has two stages strategy (1) 
setting low or lower prices to force competitors out, blocking the entry of competitors (barriers 
to entry), and in turn (2) getting a monopoly position and using the market power obtained to 
raising the old price is enough to cover the losses of the first stage (Tumlinson, 2016). Does 
predatory pricing like what they said? Is it harmful so that it must be considered as something 
illegal and requires the government to make rules on predatory pricing prohibition? This article 
is about to discuss it step by step. 
 
First, setting a low or lower price 
The term "selling at a loss" as what is mentioned in the law this is because refers to the 
sale of products or services below cost (Colombo, 2011; Peltier et al., 2013) or average variable 
cost (AVC) (Areeda & Turner, 1975; Behringer & Filistrucchi, 2015). Thus, the price set is 
shallow and definitely below the competitors' prices (Durrance, 2012). 
The predatory pricing rule is the most vulnerable of all existing legal theories and 
challenges to competition law because it involves attempting to punish behavior that would 
typically be considered a virtue by offering low or even meager prices (Crane, 2005). Also, 
predatory price is considered a complicated problem to solve in competition law because the 
reduction in predatory prices is difficult to prove and distinguish from other intense 
competition (Santoso, 2018; Scott Hemphill, 2001). It is inseparable from the complexity of 
finding the right benchmark to set a competitive or fair price (Corradi, 2018). Therefore, 
regulatory authorities, law enforcement, and supervisors need to be very vigilant and thorough 
in detecting any kind of anti-competitive behavior. Moreover, they may have clashes of opinion 
and confuse the legal domain (Mishra & Rao, 2015). 
Price reductions, selective or not, and various non-price competitive strategies (such as 
advertising and innovation) are an integral part of the ordinary competitive market process and 
strategy. This process serves an essential social purpose. This strategy serves to find products 
and services that consumers and business organizations like to provide these products and 
services (Armentano, 1989). It is a public secret that the way to make consumers delight is to 
offer them goods and services at lower prices (James, 1935). Consumers who buy from 
predators at low prices are not harmed, and they greatly benefit from predation (Easterbrook, 
1981; Elzinga & Hay, 2020). Low prices can only be bad for consumers in the long run and 
charge high monopolistic prices (Elzinga & Hay, 2020; Scott Hemphill, 2001). As long as there is 
no possibility or evidence that the company will make a recoupment, it is not harmful. 
 
Second, forcing competitors out and barriers to entry 
Predatory pricing is often interpreted and seen as the act of pricing below a competitor's 
cost to drive a competitor out of the market (Durrance, 2012) and create a barrier to entry into 
the market for potential new competitors (Kaplow, 2018; Prado et al., 2010). Thus, many 
consider that predation can be used to create so-called behavioral or strategic barriers to entry. 
Competitors will leave, and potential participants will refuse to enter if predatory behavior 
makes them hope that their attempts to compete will prove unfavorable because of the 
anticipated predatory price (Kaplow, 2018). These assumptions and arguments essentially 
make many economists and industrial organizations argue that predatory pricing is irrational 
and rarely observed. The argument is that pricing below cost to push a competitor out of the 
market would be irrational for two reasons: (1) there are more profitable ways (e.g., merger and 
acquisitions) to eliminate competitors, and (2) future price increases will result in new entries 
(Gomez et al., 2008). 
Without denying, low price is undoubtedly useful in winning over competitors, but it is 
not a crime either because, at the same time, it represents a symbol of consumer profit (surplus) 
(Elzinga & Hay, 2020). Posner (1976) argues that predatory pricing should not be considered a 
practice that barrier the entry of new competitors, most likely to delay and not even for a long 
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time (Harrison, 1988). Even if the predators successfully shut down or drive all competitors out, 
They will not dare increase their price, lest new competitors enter the market. Predatory pricing 
will not damage long-term consumer interests because long-term consumer interests are 
protected by preventing predators from disposing of goods (McGee, 2008). 
One of the most recent predation studies that are not always the behavior of price 
reduction, but considered a predatory action, will immediately drive out and prevent 
competitors from entering. (Genesove & Mullin, 2006) have found evidence that the American 
Sugar Refining Company (ASRC) is pursuing a predatory pricing strategy and preying on its 
competitors, thus making ASRC labeled a "despicable predator" of influencing rivals, lowering 
the acquisition price of small entrants and incumbents. However, the ASRC failed to block entry 
significantly and needed to accommodate the big competitors that had emerged. 
Even if it is possible (that predatory practice can shut down the competitors and prevent 
competitors from entering), according to Easterbrook (1981), it still refers to business 
competition law designed to maximize welfare by protecting competition, not competitors. 
Therefore, every competition strategy and practice that injures competitors do not fall within 
the scope of business competition law issues unless they also reduce consumer welfare. In any 
economy, price, quantity, and output always fluctuate and adjust to external and internal 
conditions. Companies planning to anticipate market changes or guard against risks may reduce 
their costs to survive and compete with competitors. These are natural and desirable in 
business and competition, regardless of the possible adverse impact on some companies and 
their owners. 
 
Third, leading a monopoly position and using the market power obtained to raise the old 
price 
One of the reasons for Law No. 5 of 1999 prohibits predatory pricing practice because it 
can lead to monopolistic practice. It is even further strengthened by the large amount of 
literature that agrees with the law that punishing predatory prices is the worst illegal open 
exploitation because the strategy is using the economic justification for getting an attempt to 
monopolize (Kennedy, 2020; Taylor et al., 2013) after the market is 'cleared' (Mazzone & 
Mingardi, 2011). For jurists or legal scholars and some other economists who argue that 
predatory pricing is rational, they also note that predatory pricing will only make sense if 
predatory firms compensate for their initial losses after gaining monopoly power. In the end, it 
is the consumer who becomes the victim because when the predation is successful, the predator 
will increase output insufficiently to compensate for the loss of output as a result of the loss of 
its competitors and then increase the price. If so, it will undoubtedly be a threat to consumers 
(Barnett et al., 2007). 
It seems that the theory and rules regarding the prohibition of predatory pricing always 
have a point of justification for it. Therefore, economists often argue that the practice of 
predatory pricing is irrational and rare for some points: 
First, there are cheaper or more specific ways to obtain or maintain a monopoly than 
sacrifice many initial costs (Milgrom & Roberts, 1982). Second, this condition makes little sense 
if used to achieve a monopoly position because other ways are more effective and, in some 
cases, let alone get a monopoly position, even to survive in the market often fails. As happened 
to Uber in Indonesia, which set cheap prices under Grab and Gojek, it fell and lost its 
competitors. On the contrary, predatory pricing might be useful and makes sense if 
implemented by companies in a monopoly market, as (Posner, 2009) argues that predatory 
pricing is only a means or method to maintain (not to get) a monopoly market. 
Third, predation is not the only thing that can get a monopoly position. Even non-price 
factors and high prices could be useful in gaining the position as was the case with the National 
Cash Register Co. (NCR) non-price, which allows it to consolidate and maintain a monopoly 
persuades customers to buy durable goods at high prices and high profits (Brevoort & Marvel, 
2004). Fourth, even for economists who argued that the predatory price is rational, it must be 
required if the predatory actor is compensated after his victory. Unfortunately, it cannot be 
guaranteed. If the firm succeeds in driving out all other competition through predatory pricing, 
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it does not mean that it will increase the prices after that (Anderson, 2003). Suppose that the 
predatory firm raises its price above the average price after successfully driving out its 
competitors from the market. The increased price will create an attraction for new competitors. 
So, apart from the absence of barriers to entry, victory in a price war is nothing but useless 
because the winning firm must keep prices close to competitive levels if they are not to risk the 
entry of potential competitors (Brooks, 1961). 
Hence, predatory pricing without a reasonable prospect of recovery will be irrational, so it 
will not happen. If a company tries to charge a lower price to harm or even damage their 
competitor predominantly, they will suffer losses and never compensate for it. As soon as they 
try to charge a higher price, later on, new firms will enter. Therefore, it is doubtless that even 
successful predators will not enjoy their victories for long because new competition will 
inevitably and quickly erode the market forces they may have conquered (Giocoli, 2014). 
Based on the explanation above, there is not enough reason for antitrust laws or courts to 
take predation seriously (Easterbrook, 1981). Therefore, the government has no urgency to 
limit or even prohibit predatory pricing practices legally, both compelling and regulatory laws 
(Armentano, 1989). Predation is not a crime. If there is predation in pricing, it must be classified 
as a victimless crime because no one's rights are violated (Fisher, 1987). Because the predation 
actors are not fraudulent, the seller may be completely transparent about prices and even 
intentions. There is no coercion in predatory prices. Even predatory prices can be agreed upon 
by buyers and sellers without threats or use of force, some parties are neither forced nor 
threatened in conducting transactions. 
On the other hand, it is precisely the existence of a competition policy that punishes 
predatory pricing practices made by the government either by law or other regulation which 
reduces consumer welfare because the regulation is tantamount to preventing consumers from 
determining the structure of market supply they expect (Armentano, 1989). In the end, price 
controls are a more dangerous solution than predatory price cuts. Therefore, it has become the 
National Consumer Protection Agency's attention (BPKN) to naturally assess that the tariff 
control policy (price), especially for the price floor, has violated consumers' rights. 
 
Price Ceiling 
The setting of price or tariff ceiling has been widely adopted and an essential feature of 
many countries' economic environment, especially for meeting basic needs (Huizinga, 1995). It 
is also a common direct market control in many market economies (Kim & Yoo, 2007). Hence, 
many countries' setting of price ceilings is also commonly used to stabilize market prices. It also 
serves as a focal point to facilitate price coordination across multiple markets (Zhang et al., 
2020). 
Price ceiling has been discussed and debated in many pieces of literature. Engelmann & 
Müller (2011) the effect of a price ceiling is harmful and can weaken competition because they 
can serve as collusive focal points for pricing decisions. Although controversial, the rule of price 
ceiling has been used in various markets because it can serve as a tool to correct inefficiencies 
stemming from inadequate competition, while another reason is to protect consumers' welfare 
(Bennett & Chioveanu, 2019). 
 
Price Ceiling and Consumer Welfare 
Price ceiling has been used extensively in the utility market, where competitive pricing is 
usually restricted, to secure low prices for consumers (Bennett & Chioveanu, 2019). So, when 
consumers pay for a good or service at a lower price, of course, this will increase the consumer 
surplus, which in turn leads to consumer welfare as defined by Bork (1978) as the ability of 
consumers to fulfill their needs and fully satisfy their desires at a price they can afford. Thus, the 
price ceiling rule is needed to assist in safeguarding consumer welfare by preventing the 
exorbitant costs associated with price increases due to volatility or aggressive reduction targets 
(Perkis et al., 2016; Roques & Savva, 2009). 
The high price caused by rising prices is the biggest threat to consumer welfare. Even 
those who criticize that predatory pricing is reasonable also argue that the threat is not low 
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prices but high prices after obtaining a monopoly position as a recoupment form (Cheng, 2020). 
Significant price increases result in a loss of real income and consumer purchasing power in all 
countries (Aftab et al., 2017). The welfare losses caused by price increases are more significant 
than the welfare gains caused by falling prices (Bellemare, 2015). So this is where the role of 
setting the upper limit tariff is needed to protect the sharp, high price (Mckibbin et al., 2014) 
and secure low prices for consumers (Bennett & Chioveanu, 2019). Therefore, the regulation 
regarding the price ceiling is believed to increase consumer surplus (Braido & Ledo, 2018)  and 
affect welfare under certain conditions (Rauh, 2004). The price ceiling limits a seller's maximum 
price and affects its bargaining power (Kujal, 1999). 
When costs are high, this situation leads to a much higher equilibrium price, in which case 
a price ceiling is more necessary than a price floor. Suppose the company charges a high price 
close to the price ceiling. The intensity of demand then decreases as most consumers soon 
discover that this will lead to a welfare loss. Purchase intensity also decreases because most 
consumers will try to find and prefer prices below their price. Hence, the ceiling cost rule can 
increase welfare and control the market's size (McCarthy, 2009). However, to further maximize 
welfare, the price ceiling setting must be close to and not too high from its marginal cost (Earle 
et al., 2007). There is no doubt that high prices endanger consumers' welfare and threaten the 
country's economy. Besides protecting consumers, the price ceiling is also to protect the 
country's economy (Bennett & Chioveanu, 2019; Edlin, 2010). 
 
Price Ceiling to Reduce and Prevent Inflation 
Inflation is defined as a continuous increase in the general level of prices for goods and 
services. The price index increase is broad inflation representing the overall level of prices for 
goods and services. A broad price index is often measured by the Consumer Price Index (CPI), 
the Personal Consumption Expenditures Price Index (PCEPI) and the GDP deflator. In addition 
to a broad price index, inflation can also be measured by a narrow price index in specific 
economic sectors such as the Reuters-CRB Index (CCI), Producer Price Index, and Employment 
Cost Index (ECI) (Yesikar et al., 2015). 
Inflation has always been a matter of concern and considered dangerous because inflation 
plays a significant role in weakening the economy. Not only that, high inflation can cause 
people's confidence in their currency and economy to decline and can make it less attractive for 
foreign investors to invest in the country concerned. Therefore, high inflation often hurts 
economic growth (Shah et al., 2019). Inflation can also cause foreign exchange or foreign 
currency to increase, which will affect (increase) prices (Pagliacci, 2020). 
Purwono et al. (2020) argue that inflation can not be separated from two harmful effects 
in the form of instability in the country's economy and the people's welfare. Economic 
instability is characterized by price increases over the prices of goods and services in general in 
a country. The increase is not an exception to the increase in the price of general commodities 
that ordinary people must use in their daily life which will then have an impact on people's 
purchasing power so that people's welfare can be reduced (Purwono et al., 2020; Shah et al., 
2019). 
Moreover, the effect of inflation will further exacerbate poor people, orphans, low 
incomes, job losses, and where they have to pay higher prices for necessities (Jaravel, 2019; 
Shah et al., 2019; Tyner & Gershenson, 2020). Therefore, the government, strategists, and 
policymakers must think more about and act on how to prevent and reduce inflation. And this is 
where price control is needed to avoid the destructive effects of inflation because inflation is an 
expression of an inadequate profit which must be balanced with price and money control 
policies (Mattick, 2016). The price ceiling has become a policy to test inflation control. 
Controlling and preventing inflation will be considered successful when the market price is 
sometimes below the price ceiling (Galbraith, 1952). Besides preventing, the price ceiling is also 
trusted and used by many countries to overcome high inflation (Aparicio & Cavallo, 2019). 
Adopting any price control should take more fundamental steps to overcome inflation (Phillips, 
1955). 
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Of course, some oppose and disagree with price controls. They expect their income to rise 
faster and higher than the price of the goods and services they buy, thus improving their 
situation and increasing demand for them. They do not realize that such benefits are always 
temporary. Sellers of goods and services whose prices have not immediately risen will be well 
aware of this fact. Soon they will raise the prices of their goods and services to the point where 
they enjoy a profit. This situation only leads to more increases in price (Becker, 1942). 
 
CONCLUSION 
Pricing is part of a strategy that is inseparable from the competitive market process. The 
price game is a legitimate competitive strategy and not illegal, like other legal competition 
strategies. So, the government's control of prices is a legislative action that destroys the freedom 
of market activities that counter-competitive and tends not to protect competition; somewhat, it 
limits competition. Moreover, some economists view price controls' negative impact from 
restricting behavior in the market to encouraging black markets and other illegal economic 
activities. Thus, there is no urgency in intervening by imposing price or tariff restrictions by the 
government. 
Unless any form of competition, both price and non-price, has led to unfair competition, 
namely competition that can harm and endanger national economic stability and welfare. So, 
state intervention is needed to take preventive action against this behavior in situations and 
conditions. In the case of a price cap, the government must set a tariff or price ceiling in order 
not only to maintain consumer welfare but also to prevent inflation from occurring, which could 
endanger the country's economy. 
Meanwhile, if the competitive strategy (pricing) does not endanger consumers' welfare, it 
favors consumers' welfare, supporting social welfare in general. There is no right or urgency for 
the government to make rules prohibiting such actions. One of them is the regulation related to 
the setting of tariffs or lower limit prices by which the government through these regulations 
either directly or indirectly endangers the welfare of consumers and prevents consumers from 
determining their preferred market supply structure. 
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